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Abstract—Currently, telecommunication networks are fully 
resilient, in terms of connectivity, to single link failures. On the 
other hand, multiple simultaneous link failures are becoming a 
concern to network operators, mainly due to malicious human 
activities. Full connectivity resilience to multiple link failures is 
too costly and other solutions must be envisaged. For a given 
maximum number of simultaneous link failures, the 
connectivity resilience metric adopted here is the minimum 
number of network node pairs that can still communicate for 
any set of failing links. In this work, the connectivity resilience 
to multiple link failures is improved by resorting to a third-
party network for temporary additional connectivity (i.e., while 
the failing links are not reestablished). In such a solution, some 
nodes must be selected to act as gateway nodes between the two 
networks. For a given network topology and a given number of 
gateway nodes, the aim is to select the most appropriate gateway 
nodes so that the connectivity resilience is improved as much as 
possible. To address this problem, a Gateway Node Selection 
(GNS) algorithm is proposed where the most damaging sets of 
failing links are identified and, then, a set cover problem type is 
defined and solved to select the gateway nodes. The 
computational results demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
proposed GNS algorithm over two well-known network 
topologies. 
Keywords—connectivity resilience, multiple link failures, 
integer linear programming, telecommunication networks  
I. INTRODUCTION  
The resilience to failures of a given telecommunication 
network is generally defined as the capacity of the network to 
maintain its services after the failures. The network resilience 
to failures can be evaluated at different levels. Low impact 
(single) failures cause the rerouting of some service flows, 
potentially degrading service latency. Medium impact failures 
can also cause link congestion degrading not only service 
latency but also the available throughput. Large-scale failures 
have the potential of disconnecting the network in different 
components causing connectivity disruption between many 
pairs of network nodes, i.e., services between nodes in 
different components can no longer be supported.  
In general, current telecommunication networks are fully 
resilient, in terms of connectivity, to single link failures. On 
the other hand, large-scale failures are becoming a concern to 
operators of telecommunication networks due to different 
reasons, as natural disasters [1] or malicious human activities 
[2]. In the latter case, current telecommunication networks are 
deployed over optical infrastructures which are vulnerable to 
many physical-layer attacks [3]. In particular, link cuts are a 
relatively straightforward method of a physical-layer attack 
and, depending on the selected links to be cut, it can severely 
degrade the services supported by the network.  
Multiple link failures have been considered in different 
contexts in the last two decades. The impact of multiple link 
failures on optical networks based on wavelength division 
multiplexing (WDM) has been studied long time ago [4–5]. 
Multiple link failures have been modelled as shared risk link 
groups (SRLGs), i.e., groups of links with high probability of 
simultaneous failure [6–7]. The typical example is when 
multiple links share a single duct and, thus, the unattended cut 
of the duct makes all links to be simultaneously cut. More 
recently, multiple link failures have been modelled as regional 
failures in the context of natural disasters [1, 8–9]. In all these 
works, there is correlation of some kind between the failing 
links. Concerning uncorrelated failures, the particular case of 
dual link failures has also been addressed in different works 
[10–13]. Nevertheless, the case of more than two 
simultaneous uncorrelated failures (which can happen in 
malicious human activities when the attacker knows the 
network topology), has only been considered by very few 
works [14–16]. 
Full connectivity resilience to multiple link failures is too 
costly for a network operator as it requires too many physical 
links. Instead, operators need to enhance the connectivity 
resilience to such failures with solutions that do not represent 
a prohibitive investment. A recent example is the common 
emergency packet transport network proposed in [17] for 
disaster recovery. In that proposal, a third-party entity builds 
an emergency network with the surviving resources of 
multiple network operators (affected by a regional disaster) 
that can be jointly used by them. The emergency network is 
built in several steps to avoid confidential information leakage 
between network operators. 
Here, we consider a simpler approach which does not 
require the third-party entity to exist (and also avoids 
confidential information leakage between operators). 
Consider an operator of a network deployed on an area (a 
region, a country or a continent) where other networks (of 
other operators) also exist. In the case of a multiple link 
failure, a cost effective solution is to resort to a third-party 
network to provide temporary connectivity between some 
network nodes while the failing links are not reestablished. 
The business relation between the two network operators can 
be one-way (the third-party operator charges the temporary 
connectivity provided when needed) or two-way (each 
operator provides the temporary connectivity when needed by 
the other), which might even eliminate the service costs 
charged between operators depending on the Service Level 
Agreement (SLA) defined between them. In any case, some 
nodes of one network must be selected to act as gateway nodes 
to the other network. 
The connectivity resilience of the network is assumed to 
be the minimum number of network node pairs that can still 
communicate after any set of failing links (for a given 
maximum number L of simultaneous failures). Consider the 
example in Fig. 1 where two nodes of the network are set as 
gateway nodes, each one connecting to a node of the third-
party network (in general, the number of gateway nodes can 
be two or more). Then, consider the simultaneous failure of 
the 3 links highlighted in dashed red in Fig. 2. Without the 
third-party network, this failure causes the network to be split 
in two components (one with 2 nodes and one with 5 nodes) 
and, before the recovery of at least one failing link, only nodes 
belonging to the same component can communicate between 
them. With the provision of a temporary “virtual link” by the 
third-party network between the gateway nodes (with a 
throughput defined in accordance to the SLA between the two 
operators), all network nodes can communicate between them. 
In fact, the two selected gateway nodes are optimal for any 
simultaneous failure of 3 links: these gateway nodes guarantee 
that any set of 3 failing links can disconnect at most one node 
from all others. 
 
Fig. 1. Use of 2 gateway nodes to a third-party network. 
 
Fig. 2. Provision of a temporary virtual link between the gateway nodes 
for the simultaneous failure of 3 links (highlighted in dashed red). 
For a given network topology and a given number of 
gateway nodes, the aim is to select the gateway nodes to the 
third-party operator so that the connectivity resilience is 
improved as much as possible. To address this problem, a 
Gateway Node Selection (GNS) algorithm is proposed where 
the most damaging sets of failing links are identified and, then, 
a set cover problem type is defined and solved to select the 
most appropriate gateway nodes. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes 
how the connectivity resilience is evaluated for a given 
network either without gateway nodes or with a given set of 
gateway nodes. Section III describes the GNS algorithm. In 
section IV, a set of computational results is presented and the 
effectiveness of the GNS algorithm is discussed. Finally, 
Section V ends with the main conclusions of the work. 
II. CONNECTIVITY RESILIENCE EVALUATION  
First, consider the connectivity resilience evaluation of a 
given telecommunications network without gateway nodes. 
The network is defined by an undirected graph ܩ = (ܰ, ܧ). 
Each node of set ܰ is labelled as 1, 2, 3, …, ݊, where ݊ = |ܰ|. 
Each link of set ܧ is defined by (݅, ݆), with ݅, ݆ ∈ ܰ and ݅ < ݆. 
For a given a positive integer L, the connectivity resilience 
of graph ܩ for L simultaneous link failures is defined as the 
minimum number of node pairs that can communication 
whatever set of ܮ failing links. The connectivity resilience is 
given by the optimal solution of the Critical Link Detection 
(CLD) optimization problem defined as follows. 
Consider a binary variable ݒ௜௝  for each link (݅, ݆) ∈ ܧ 
which is equal to 1 if link (݅, ݆) is a critical (failing) link; or 
equal to 0, otherwise. Consider also a binary variable ݑ௜௝ for 
each pair of nodes ݅, ݆ ∈ ܰ, with ݅ < ݆, which is equal to 1 if 
nodes ݅ and ݆ can communicate in the surviving network (i.e., 
in the network without the critical links). The CLD problem is 
defined by mixed integer linear programming as: 
Minimize ∑ ∑ ݑ௜௝௡௝ୀ௜ାଵ௡ିଵ௜ୀଵ  (1) 
Subject to: 
∑ ݒ௜௝(௜,௝)∈ா ≤ ܮ   (2) 
ݑ௜௝ + ݒ௜௝ ≥ 1  , (݅, ݆) ∈ ܧ (3) 
ݑ௜௝ ≥ ݑ{௜௞} + ݑ{௞௝} − 1  , ݅, ݆ ∈ ܰ: ݅ < ݆, ݇ ∈ ܰ(݅, ݆) (4) 
ݒ௜௝ ∈ {0,1}  , (݅, ݆) ∈ ܧ (5) 
ݑ௜௝ > 0		 , ݅, ݆ ∈ ܰ: ݅ < ݆ (6) 
The objective function (1) is the minimization of the 
connectivity resilience, i.e., of the number of node pairs that 
can communicate in the surviving network. Constraint (2) 
guarantees that the number of critical links is not higher than 
ܮ . Constraints (3) guarantee that the end nodes of a link 
(݅, ݆) ∈ ܧ can communicate if it is not a critical (failing) link, 
i.e., if ݒ௜௝ = 0. 
Constraints (4) guarantee that each pair of nodes ݅, ݆ ∈ ܰ, 
with ݅ < ݆, can communicate if there is a third node ݇ such 
that ݇ can communicate with both ݅ and ݆. In constraints (4), 
ݑ{௜௞}  represents ݑ௜௞  if ݅ < ݇ , or ݑ௞௜  otherwise (the same 
meaning for ݑ{௞௝} ). In order to minimize the number of 
constraints (4), it is enough to consider ݇  as the neighbor 
nodes of either ݅ or ݆. In the notation of constraints (4), set 
ܰ(݅, ݆) is the set of neighbor nodes of the node (among ݅ and 
݆) with the lowest degree and, if nodes ݅ and ݆ are neighbors 
(i.e., if (݅, ݆) ∈ ܧ), one is excluded as neighbor of the other. 
Finally, constraints (5–6) are the variable domain 
constraints. Note that only variables ݒ௜௝  are declared as 
binary. Variables ݑ௜௝  do not need to be declared as binary 
since they will be set to binary values in any optimal solution. 
Consider now the connectivity resilience evaluation of a 
given telecommunications network with a given set of 
gateway nodes. We can model this case by: 
• considering an augmented graph ܩ’ by adding to graph ܩ 
one extra link per pair of gateway nodes, and 
• assuming that the extra links never fail (they represent the 
virtual links provided by the third-party operator only when 
needed). 
So, the connectivity resilience of a network with a set of 
gateway nodes is the optimal solution of the CLD model 
defined over the augmented graph ܩ’ and setting the variables 
ݒ௜௝  equal to 0 for all extra links (݅, ݆). This optimization model 
will be referred henceforward as CLD-S model.    
III. GATEWAY NODE SELECTION (GNS) ALGORITHM  
Consider the notation introduced in the previous section. 
The GNS algorithm aims to select a set of nodes on a given 
graph ܩ  to be configured as gateway nodes. The algorithm 
requires the determination not only of the most damaging set 
of failing links (i.e., the set of Critical Links) but also the 
second, third (and so on) most damaging sets of failing links. 
The solution of the CLD model (presented in the previous 
section II) gives the most damaging set of failing links. To 
compute the next (i.e., the second) set of most damaging 
failing links, we need to add to the CLD model a constraint 
excluding the first solution from its feasible set. Consider the 
binary values of the variables ݒ௜௝  of the optimal solution of the 
CLD represented by ݒ෤௜௝ଵ  and consider the value ܮଵ  given by 
the sum of all values ݒ෤௜௝ଵ , i.e., ܮଵ = ∑ ൫ݒ෤௜௝ଵ ൯(௜,௝)∈ா . The CLD-1 
model is then defined as: 
Minimize 		(1) 
Subject to: 
(2–6) 
∑ ൫ݒ෤௜௝ଵ × ݒ௜௝൯(௜,௝)∈ா ≤ ܮଵ   (7.1) 
The solution of CLD-1 model gives the second most 
damaging set of failing links. Again, considering the values of 
ݒ௜௝  of the optimal solution of CLD-1 represented ݒ෤௜௝ଶ  and ܮଶ =
∑ ൫ݒ෤௜௝ଶ ൯(௜,௝)∈ா , the CLD-2 model is defined as: 
Minimize 		(1) 
Subject to: 
(2–6), (7.1) 
∑ ൫ݒ෤௜௝ଶ × ݒ௜௝൯(௜,௝)∈ா ≤ ܮଶ   (7.2) 
The solution of CLD-2 model gives the third most 
damaging set of failing links. All next sets of most damaging 
failing links are computed by iteratively repeating this 
procedure. In general, the CLD-k model has one constraint for 
each of the k most damaging sets of failing links and its 
optimal solution provides the (k+1)th most damaging set of 
failing links. 
Then, the selection of the gateway nodes is based on the 
previously computed most damaging sets of failing links. 
Note that the kth most damaging set, defined by the binary 
parameters ݒ෤௜௝௞ , splits the network in two or more components. 
By computing the surviving graph  ܩ௞ = (ܰ, (݅, ݆) ∈ ܧ: ݒ෤௜௝௞ =
0), we can determine the 2 largest components (in number of 
nodes). Consider ଵܰ௞ and ଶܰ௞ as the set of nodes of the largest 
and second largest component of the surviving graph ܩ௞. In 
order to guarantee that the nodes of the 2 largest components 
can communicate in the kth most damaging set of failing links, 
one needs to ensure that one gateway node belongs to ଵܰ௞ and 
another gateway node belongs to ଶܰ௞. 
The selection of the gateway nodes is based on a set cover 
problem (SCP). Consider the number of gateway nodes (to be 
selected) given by ܤ and the number of most damaging sets 
(to be considered) given by ܭ. Consider a binary variable ݔ௜ 
for each node ݅ ∈ ܰ which is equal to 1 if node ݅ is selected as 
a gateway node, or equal to 0 otherwise. Consider also the 
parameter ܿ௜ which is given by the closeness centrality value 
of node ݅ ∈ ܰ in graph ܩ (i.e., ܿ௜ = 1 ∑ ݌௜௝௝ஷ௜⁄  and ݌௜௝  is the 
length of the shortest path from node ݅ to node ݆ in ܩ). The 
selection of the gateway nodes is based on the optimal solution 
of the following SCP-K model: 
Maximize ∑ ܿ௜ݔ௜௜∈ே  (8) 
Subject to: 
∑ ݔ௜௜∈ே ≤ ܤ   (9) 
∑ ݔ௜௜∈ேభೖ ≥ 1  , ݇ = 1…ܭ (10) 
∑ ݔ௜௜∈ேమೖ ≥ 1  , ݇ = 1…ܭ (11) 
ݔ௜ ∈ {0,1}  , ݅ ∈ ܰ (12) 
The objective function (8) is the maximization of the 
closeness centrality of the nodes selected as gateway nodes. 
Constraint (9) guarantee that the number of gateway nodes is 
not higher than ܤ. Constraints (10–11) guarantee that each of 
the 2 largest components of each set of failing links contains 
(is covered by) one gateway node. Finally, constraints (12) are 
the variable domain constraints. 
Note that, when the set of constraints (9–12) admits 
multiple solutions, the objective function (8) gives preference 
to the selection of more central nodes, minimizing in this way 
the average shortest path length from each node to the closest 
gateway node. 
Algorithm 1. Gateway Node Selection Algorithm 
1. Determine the most damaging set ܧଵ  of failing links by 
solving CLD model (defined in Section II) 
2. Define SCP-1 model based on the nodes ଵܰଵ and ଶܰଵ of the 
largest and second largest component defined by ܧଵ 
3. Determine a set of gateway nodes ߩ௢௣௧ by solving SCP-1 
model 
4. Determine the connectivity resilience ݎ௢௣௧  of the set of 
gateway nodes ߩ௢௣௧ by solving the CLD-S model (defined 
in Section II) 
5. k ← 2 , continue ← TRUE 
6. While continue is TRUE Do 
a. Determine the kth most damaging set ܧ௞  of failing 
links by solving CLD-(k–1) model 
b. Define SCP-k based on the nodes ଵܰ௞ and ଶܰ௞ of the 
largest and second largest component defined by ܧ௞ 
c. Determine a set of gateway nodes ߩ௔௨௫  by solving 
SCP-k model 
d. If SCP-k model is feasible Then 
  • Determine the connectivity resilience ݎ௔௨௫  of the 
    set of gateway nodes ߩ௔௨௫ by solving the 
    CLD-S model 
  • If ݎ௔௨௫ > ݎ௢௣௧ Then 
   ݎ௢௣௧ ← ݎ௔௨௫  , ߩ௢௣௧ ← ߩ௔௨௫ 
     EndIf 
  • k ← k + 1 
Else 
  • continue ← FALSE 
EndIf 
  EndWhile 
One difficulty in using the SCP-K model (8–12) is that one 
cannot know in advance the proper value of ܭ (i.e., how many 
most damaging sets of failing links to include in the model). 
The value of K should be as large as possible without turning 
the model infeasible. The Gateway Node Selection (GNS) 
algorithm proposed in this work is an iterative method that, at 
each iteration, the next most damaging set of failing links is 
computed and the resulting set cover problem is solved. The 
method ends when the set cover problem becomes infeasible. 
During all iterations, the connectivity resilience of each set 
cover solution is computed and the method selects the solution 
with the highest connectivity resilience value. The proposed 
GNS algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1. At the end of the 
algorithm, ߩ௢௣௧ is the set of selected gateway nodes and ݎ௢௣௧ 
is its resilience value (as provided by the CLD-S model). 
IV. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS  
Consider the Janos-us (with 26 nodes, 42 links and 325 
node pairs) and Germany50 (with 50 nodes, 88 links and 1225 
node pairs) well-known network topologies [18] presented in 
Fig. 3. The figure also highlights in red the most damaging set 
of ܮ = 6 failing links when no gateway nodes are used. In 
Germany50, the failing link which is not visible in the figure 
is link (10,17).  
 
 
Fig. 3. Geographical networks highlighting in red 
the most damaging set of L = 6 failing links. 
In the Janos-us case, the failing links split the topology in 
one component of 12 nodes, one component of 9 nodes and 
one component of 5 nodes. So, the connectivity resilience of 
Janos-us is ቀ122 ቁ + ቀ
9
2ቁ + ቀ
5
2ቁ = 112 node pairs which is 34.5% 
of the total number of node pairs. In the Germany50 case, the 
failing links split the topology in one component of 34 nodes 
and one component of 16 nodes. So, the connectivity 
resilience of Germany50 is ቀ342 ቁ + ቀ
16
2 ቁ  = 681 node pairs 
which, in this case, is 55.6% of the total number of node pairs. 
The GNS algorithm was run for these two network 
topologies considering the number of failing links ܮ = 3, 4, 5 
and 6 and the number of gateway nodes ܤ = 2, 3 and 4. The 
GNS algorithm was implemented in MATLAB and all 
optimization models were solved using CPLEX 12.8 software 
package. All results were obtained on a PC platform with an 
Intel Core i7 8th generation processor and 32 GBytes of RAM. 
Table I shows the connectivity resilience (in number of 
node pairs that can communicate) of each network for each 
value of ܮ. Not surprisingly, a higher number of failing links 
results in a lower connectivity resilience value (more failing 
links disconnect more node pairs) and the absolute resilience 
values are higher for Germany50 since its total number of 
node pairs is higher than the total number of node pairs of 
Janos-us. 
TABLE I.  CONNECTIVITY RESILIENCE (IN NO. OF NODE PAIRS) 
WITHOUT GATEWAY NODES 
Network L = 3 L = 4 L = 5 L = 6
Janos-us 205 157 154 112
Germany50 1084 1000 796 681
 
Table II presents the computational results of the GNS 
algorithm for Janos-us network. Column ‘Res’ presents the 
connectivity resilience value of each solution. Then, column 
‘NIter’ indicates how many iterations were run by the GNS 
algorithm and column ‘Time’ presents the running time (in 
seconds) of the GNS algorithm. The performance (in number 
of iterations and running time) observed in Table II shows that 
the GNS algorithm is efficient for Janos-us (largest running 
time below 3 minutes) implying that larger cases (in terms of 
ܮ and ܤ values) can also be solved. 
TABLE II.  GNS COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS FOR JANOS-US 
L B Res NIter Time (s)
3 
2 256 18 4.4
3 300 25 7.3
4 300 28 9.2
4 
2 220 20 3.5
3 256 42 9.5
4 256 48 12.3
5 
2 172 30 4.0
3 205 113 32.6
4 205 125 38.0
6 
2 130 9 1.1
3 152 13 1.8
4 180 351 168.9
 
In terms of connectivity resilience, Fig. 4 presents the 
resilience gains (in percentage) obtained by the selected 
gateway nodes, i.e., the resilience gains from the values 
without gateway nodes (presented in Table I for Janos-us) and 
the values with gateway nodes (presented in Table II). The 
results in Fig. 4 show that the gains are very much parameter 
dependent. For example, with B = 2 gateway nodes, a high 
resilience gain of 40.1% is obtained for L = 4 failing links 
while an only moderate resilience gain of 11.7% is obtained 
for L = 5 failing links. Moreover, more gateway nodes do not 
always provide better resilience: increasing from 2 to 3 
gateway nodes has improved the connectivity resilience for all 
cases but increasing from 3 to 4 gateway nodes has only 
improved the connectivity resilience for L = 6 failing links. 
 
Fig. 4. Resilience gains for Janos-us network. 
Table III presents the computational results of the GNS 
algorithm for Germany50 network (the meaning of each 
column is the same as in Table II). 
TABLE III.  GNS COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS FOR GERMANY50 
C B Res. No. Iter. Time (s)
 
3 
2 1129 16 84.9
3 1129 18 112.9
4 1129 24 186.7
 
4 
2 1082 10 119.4
3 1084 15 192.4
4 1084 24 321.1
 
5 
2 961 6 28.9
3 1000 29 163.8
4 1000 41 306.1
 
6 
2 856 24 85.8
3 856 26 117.4
4 952 101 731.2
 
In the Germany50 case, the running times of GNS 
algorithm are in the order of some minutes for the problems 
instances with the largest ܮ  and ܤ  values (a little over 12 
minutes in the worst case), indicating that the algorithm 
cannot solve much larger cases (in terms of ܮ and ܤ values). 
As in the Janos-us case, Fig. 5 presents the resilience gains 
(in percentage) from the resilience values without gateway 
nodes (Table I for Germany50) to the resilience values with 
gateway nodes (Table III). In this case, it is clear that the 
resilience gains increase for larger number of failing links L, 
a behavior that is very different to the one observed on the 
Janos-us problem instances, highlighting also that the 
resilience gains are also dependent on the topology of the 
network. Nevertheless, an observation that is common to both 
networks is that more gateway nodes do not always provide 
better resilience. In the Germany50 case, increasing from 2 to 
3 gateway nodes has only improved the connectivity resilience 
for L = 4 (very slightly) and for L = 5 (significantly) failing 
links and did not improve the connectivity resilience for L = 2 
and 6 failing links. Like in Janos-us, increasing from 3 to 4 
gateway nodes has only improved the connectivity resilience 
for L = 6 failing links. 
 
Fig. 5. Resilience gains for Germany50 network. 
For illustration purposes, Fig. 6 presents for both networks 
the gateway nodes (highlighted in blue) provided by the GNS 
algorithm for B = 4 gateway nodes and considering L = 6 
failing links. The figure also shows the most damaging set of 
failing links (highlighted in red) of these solutions. 
 
Fig. 6. The solutions with B = 4 gateway nodes (in blue) for L = 6 failing 
links (the most damaging set of the solution highlighted in red). 
In the Janos-us case, the failing links split the topology in 
one component of 19 nodes, one component of 4 nodes and 
one component of 3 nodes. So, the connectivity resilience of 
Janos-us with the four selected gateway nodes is now ቀ192 ቁ +
ቀ42ቁ + ቀ
4
2ቁ = 180 node pairs, which represents an increase of 
60.7% from the solution without gateway nodes (presented in 
Fig. 3). In the Germany50 case, the failing links split the 
topology in one component of 44 nodes and two components 
of 3 nodes each. So, the connectivity resilience of Germany50 
with the four selected gateway nodes is now ቀ442 ቁ + 2 × ቀ
3
2ቁ = 
952 node pairs, which represents an increase of 39.8% from 
the solution without gateway nodes (presented in Fig. 3). 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Multiple simultaneous link failures are becoming a 
concern to network operators, mainly due to malicious human 
activities. Current telecommunication networks are deployed 
over optical infrastructures which are particularly vulnerable 
to link-cut attacks, a relatively straightforward method of a 
physical-layer attack. Full connectivity resilience to multiple 
link failures is too costly and, instead, operators need to 
enhance the connectivity resilience to multiple link failures 
with solutions that do not represent a prohibitive investment. 
One cost effective solution is to use a third-party network to 
provide temporary connectivity between some network nodes 
while the failing links are not reestablished. In such a solution, 
some nodes must be selected to act as gateway nodes between 
the two networks. 
This work has addressed the gateway node selection 
problem aiming to improve the connectivity resilience of a 
given network as much as possible to multiple link failures. 
To address this problem, a Gateway Node Selection (GNS) 
algorithm was proposed where the most damaging sets of 
failing links are identified and, then, a set cover problem type 
is defined and solved to select the gateway nodes. 
Two well-known network topologies were used in the 
computational results and the GNS algorithm was run for the 
simultaneous failure of up to a maximum of L = 6 links and to 
the selection of up to B = 4 gateway nodes. The computational 
results have shown that the proposed algorithm can solve all 
problem instances. Concerning the connectivity resilience 
gains obtained by using a third-party network, the results have 
shown that the gains are very much case dependent, i.e., they 
depend on the particular network topology, and on the 
particular values of L and B.  
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